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SUMMARY
Outward processing trade as measured in
the macroeconomic statistics became an im-
portant factor of Hungarian exports during
the 1990s. Likewise, it played an important
role in many Hungarian manufacturing
companies in the form of subcontracting as
a type of business contact. The basic char-
acteristics of subcontracting changed very
much during the past decade worldwide,
and the relationship of partners in this form
of cooperation became more balanced. An-
other distinct microeconomic development
was the establishment of new types of coop-
eration networks. Outsourcing, for example,
became a spreading form of cooperation.
These two developments inspired the author
to try and check if subcontracting can be
interpreted as a special form of outsourcing.
If this hypothesis proves true then the previ-
ous negative interpretations of subcontract-
ing will also require reconsideration.
The study starts with a theoretical
comparison of definitions, regulatory back-
ground and business effects of the two phe-
nomena. Striking similarity in the rationale
of the two was found. Besides, the real ef-
fects of subcontracting turned out to be
rather advantageous for Hungarian manu-
facturing firms striving for the modernisa-
tion of their activity. The anecdotal evidence
suggested that many Hungarian firms chose
the development of subcontracting links
with the more developed, well-established
Western firms as a primary tool of receiving
necessary modernisation inputs. They delib-
erately chose this option among several de-
cision possibilities as the best one, and made
it the basis of their long-term modernisation
strategy. The many negative effect previ-
ously connected to subcontracting appar-
ently did not apply to these firms. There was
another group of companies engaged in
subcontracting that achieved less success.
Most of these companies entered or contin-
ued subcontracting as a last chance and had
basically no alternative options. They could
usually not use this contact as a tool of mod-
ernisation, just as a means of short-run sur-
vival. Without the necessary adjustment and
modernisation they soon had to exit markets.
The theoretical background and the
anecdotal evidence suggested an interesting
interpretation. The study states that subcon-
tracting has become a major engine of mod-
ernisation and international integration for
many Hungarian manufacturing firms. Sub-
contracting links themselves are rather a
form of outsourcing, and provide the nec-
essary durability, knowledge and technology
transfer, market access that are associated
with outsourcing in general. The second part
of the study empirically tested this statement.
The empirical survey used a sample of over
100 firms engaged in subcontracting while
dynamic comparisons were also possible to
make to some extent, since there were two
separate observations.
The survey results largely proved the
hypothesis. Subcontracting was taken by
firms as a deliberately chosen essential part
of their strategic modernisation efforts. It
provided a large variety of pulling effects. As
a business contract subcontracting was al-
ways considered a profitable one, implying
that even the short-term profits were shared
between partners. Subcontracting links
showed substantial durability and develop-
ment in the medium and long run providing
a chance for companies to become regular
supplier partners.
5INTRODUCTION
Although parents always recall the differ-
ences between their accustomed way of life
and what their children regard as normal,
they do not usually say that the world has
changed fundamentally, except in very rare
periods. However, we seem to be in such a
period now, when not only the means of
production – the hardware – is changing
quickly, but also the way of thinking, living
and doing business. This change of business
software is tightly bound to the hardware
developments and indeed facilitates them.
What is needed in software development?
New technologies and production facilities
incorporate enormous quantities of acceler-
ated knowledge, both technical and com-
mercial. The sophisticated production net-
works currently in use are suitable for mass
customization rather than mass production.
This makes for flexible production, but re-
quires extensive accumulation of tangible
and intangible capital: up-to-date machin-
ery and the relevant marketing, financial
and management knowledge. Even the larg-
est corporations can no longer achieve this
high concentration of competencies. The
quality of cooperation among business enti-
ties has become the core issue of interna-
tional competitiveness.
The current wave of corporate coop-
eration started at least two decades ago,
when large conglomerates began to slim
down and trim their diversified portfolios.
Mergers and acquisitions still influence the
international business landscape greatly.
One major avenue of corporate restructur-
ing is concentration on core competencies
and expansion within the core business. The
other is to complete the business line with
various forms of networking. Cooperation –
the creation of business networks – came to
be regarded as a suitable organizational in-
novation for the changed business hardware
and software. While the economy of the
20th century was dominated by large, con-
centrated, hierarchically structured corpo-
rations, that of the 21st century will be ruled
by cooperating business networks.
If international cooperation networks
will be the nucleus of 21st-century business,
the chances for the emerging economies of
Central and Eastern Europe to catch up will
have to be re-evaluated in this context. Are
they ready to join international production
networks? What are the costs and benefits of
joining such networks? Should economic
policy promote such integration, and if so,
how? It may not be an exaggeration to say
that the coincidence of these changes with at
least potentially creative destruction of the
old economic structure and regime brings
unique opportunities to restructure the roles
and ties of the Central and Eastern European
economies in the international division of
labour.
Many characteristics of networking
have been discussed in the literature
(HANDY, 1989, MOORE, 1993, TULLY, 1993,
MORGAN, 1989, etc.), but a precise definition
is still wanting. Authors agree that network
development started because the old type of
vertical corporate structure proved ineffi-
cient at keeping up with the accelerating
technological development and the even
speedier market changes. Traditional busi-
ness partners started to establish more
regular and strategic cooperation as a way
of increasing their flexibility and capital
concentration. This was characteristic of R
and D partnerships, production joint ven-
tures and product-specialization agree-
ments. This set of cooperation links enabled
participating firms to concentrate on their
core activities without risk of losing other,
necessary activities in the value chain.
The essence of the network is its flexi-
bility. The participation of single companies
is reduced to the minimum level of contri-
bution. The value chain is not burdened
with capacities and competencies that are
not required for a specific project. In this
sense, cooperation is also occasional. Net-
works are often compared to the well-
known Lego construction sets, where single
bricks can be positioned in many different
6ways or not even used in certain projects
(DESS et al., 1995). It is not the task of this
paper to contribute to the general discussion
of cooperative networks or offer a full set of
the different types of network (joint R and D,
franchise agreements, regional networks,
etc.) It concentrates on a single type of net-
work: outsourcing, or more specifically,
subcontracting. The aim is to analyse sub-
contracting activity in Hungary from the
angle of international production networks,
by evaluating whether subcontracting has
the potential to act as a bridge for Hungar-
ian firms into the partnership of interna-
tional production networks.
The paper presents first a set of statis-
tics that illustrates the dimensions and basic
characteristics of subcontracting and out-
ward processing trade (OPT)1 in Hungary.
Next, a hypothesis is advanced and exam-
ined using data from over 100 firms that
perform subcontracting. The database de-
rives from a major research programme at
the Business Economics Department of the
Budapest University of Economics. Over 300
companies visited in 1996 and in 1999 were
asked a set of questions about all aspects of
their company and business. The question-
naires were not targeted at problems of sub-
contracting, but it was possible to distin-
guish the group that pursued such activity.
The following analysis is therefore a by-
product, so to speak, of the original research
programme, which was entitled ‘Competing
in the World’.
                                                
1 The legal regulations on OPT include a definition of
the transactions covered by the category, although no
clear definition of subcontracting exists. The two
overlap to a large extent, since both relate to interna-
tional business transactions in which subcontractors
take over some processing of production inputs deliv-
ered by their contracting partners and transfer all the
processed goods back to their country of origin. The
differentiation is made on a conceptual basis. OPT is
used as an international trade category, while sub-
contracting denotes a type of contract between busi-
ness partners in specific circumstances, with effects
on both parties.
1. WHY SUBCONTRACTING IS
TREATED AS A TYPE OF
NETWORKING
To reveal the relevance of the comparison
with subcontracting, it is necessary first to
identify the main characteristics of coopera-
tion networks and the specific features of
outsourcing.2 Since there is no clear defini-
tion of networking and the objects of inves-
tigation were created spontaneously rather
than according to definitions or regulations,
the role and significance of certain features
may vary widely between networks.3
Network-type linkages may develop
among partners through outsourcing. This
practice started some ten years ago, as large
multinational corporations began contract-
ing outsider companies to run some of their
complete strategic functions. Most common
was the outsourcing of informatics, but
there were also examples in human re-
sources. A broader definition of outsourcing
embraces outward location of other, non-
                                                
2 This section is based largely on the review of the
literature provided in Szabó (1998a and 1998b).
3 According to Szabó (1998a and 1998b), networks
form a type of coordination mechanism different
from market forces and from corporate hierarchies.
They are not, or not exclusively ruled by contracts or
money – mutuality of exchanges – but by reciprocity
(in the sense of Polányi). The exchange of benefits
within the networks is not necessarily mutual. Often
it is indirect and loose, and the competencies of the
partners tend to be complementary to each other.
Since networks are open ended, the propensity to
cooperate efficiently is secured by the potential re-
placement of partners. The quality of the contribu-
tions made to the network is also monitored by some
kind of watchdog mechanism. This is necessary be-
cause the absence of contracts means there are no
potential penalties for failures. Partners in networks
develop social ties alongside their business contacts.
Partners adjust to each other, and after some time,
begin to think and act in similar ways. Functions,
values and decisions are shared and administrative,
financial and logistic structures adjusted to enhance
the cooperation. Possession of many ‘network-
specific’ assets may also lock partners into the system:
the barriers to exit may grow high in this structure
too.
7functional types of activity: R and D projects,
key elements in the production chain, secu-
rity, cleaning and catering may be described
as ‘outsourced’. The essence of outsourcing
is that a company contracts an outside eco-
nomic actor to perform a function that has
been carried out in-house. This paper re-
stricts the term to activities having some
strategic importance. In cases of subcon-
tracting, the subcontracted activity is usually
an important part of the production process.
Machinery and equipment, capacities and
some knowledge are provided to the sub-
contractor. In the broader definition of
outsourcing, the supply of equipment is usu-
ally not included.4 In the case of subcon-
tracting, it is precisely the tight control of
activities, including the supply of all pro-
duction inputs, which makes possible a
comparison with outsourcing.
Outsourcing is a basic tool in the proc-
ess of reducing activities to core competen-
cies. Firms concentrate on what they do best
(BUSS, 1995). It is also a suitable tool for
flattening out the organization chart and
reducing the levels of hierarchical decision
making, which also increases flexibility.
Outsourcing increases the potential stock of
assets, because firms may use the competen-
cies of others without the additional costs of
stocking and maintaining the assets for do-
ing so. Production capacities as well as tan-
gible assets can be utilized flexibly according
to demand. Furthermore, the staff and work-
ers need not be high-cost regular employees.
They can be hired sporadically from spe-
cialized agencies or the labour of other con-
tractors can be used together with their pro-
duction facilities. This flexible combination
of capacities and competencies is the essence
of outsourcing (and other network types). It
increases the specialization of firms, so that
in effect it is ‘vertical disintegration’ (SZABÓ,
1998a).
Because of the fierce competition,
companies are becoming more demanding
with their partners. The outsourcing link-
                                                
4 There has been rapid inflation of the term. The term
outsourcing is sometimes used for long-term trade
contracts for the supply of certain parts or assemblies.
ages are not necessarily determined by price.
Quality, reliable delivery and rapid produc-
tion-changing abilities are the attributes
most valued in subcontracting. Core compa-
nies often assist partners in improving these
attributes by transferring technology and
expertise. The new understanding of the
competitive strength of complete value
chains (PORTER, 1985) puts pressure on the
weakest links in the chain to catch up. Fur-
thermore, integral, flexible cooperation
among firms requires regular, intensive
contacts between the partners. The common
tasks and goals set will change over time.
Many strategic partners prepare for new
business projects together. The development
of new products (including R and D), pene-
tration of new markets and the introduction
of new services all require careful joint
preparation and teamwork.
The other major goal of outsourcing is
cost reduction. In broad terms, this means
that even the biggest companies are not able
to provide the whole range of products and
services on any specific market. Since com-
plete, full-range solutions compete on the
markets, companies must specialize in the
core activities in which they enjoy long-term
competitive advantages (PORTER, 1985).
Everything else is combined with the supply
by other specialists. Specialization also in-
duces important economies of scale. For ex-
ample, outsourcers that have several clients
can use the same expensive equipment or
knowledge to cater for them all, so sharing
(time-sharing) at least some of the costs.
Bulk purchase may be another source of
savings. The reduction in the extent of ac-
tivities may also reduce the size of the cor-
poration, which is another important way of
reducing costs.
Another important area where impor-
tant advantages can be achieved is human
resource management. Occasional hiring of
labour instead of regular full-time employ-
ment means a lot of cost saving, let alone the
inconveniences of firing, of the adjustment
to sophisticated regulations that are con-
trolled by trade unions and governments,
etc. But there is also another source of ad-
vantage: flexible use of labour and continual
8development of skills, according to current
market demands. The rigidity of regular em-
ployment leads to clumsy reactions, slow
changes in skills and education, or simply
rigidity of working conditions and tasks. It is
difficult and expensive for a firm with a
certain workforce to change its structure, by
putting more people onto one job currently
in demand and taking them off others. Such
changes can usually be carried out only
through expensive, time-consuming re-
training. Such problems are largely avoided
by temporary hiring.
After that brief account of some as-
pects of networking and outsourcing, it is
time to turn to the question of whether sub-
contracting can be regarded as a special
form of outsourcing. First, let us define sub-
contracting. The author sees a similarity of
rationale between subcontracting and
outsourcing, which have many other fea-
tures in common, although there are big
differences between individual cases. Per-
haps a more balanced statement would be to
say that subcontracting was a type of
outsourcing, but the real chances for devel-
oping strong networking linkages depended
on many circumstances. Thus firms in Cen-
tral Europe have an option to become part of
competitive international production net-
works, but this option has conditions at-
tached.
Most subcontracting can indeed be re-
garded as a type of outsourcing. The reasons
for resorting to this special form of coopera-
tion are identical to those for outsourcing, in
the main, cost reduction, cheaper labour,
and flexible use of capacities in line with
market needs. Subcontracting in a way also
fulfils the conditions of the narrow-sense
definition of outsourcing. The contractor
receives materials and components that are
the property of the partner and pursues pre-
defined processing on them for a contracted
fee. But why use this special form instead of
normal outsourcing or FDI? The reason lies
in the special tax and customs concessions
available, which provide additional cost ad-
vantages. Since the imported materials and
other production inputs are transferred back
entirely to the country of origin, in a proc-
essed form, the authorities provide full ex-
emption from customs duty and VAT. These
exemptions and the cheap labour provide
the cost advantages over domestic produc-
tion.
Antalóczy and Sass (1998), reviewing
the literature on subcontracting, found that
both the relative and the absolute wage lev-
els were of primary importance. The quality
and productivity of labour are decisive in
comparison with other potential production
sites, including both domestic production
and other foreign locations. The sharp in-
crease in subcontracting in Hungary was
induced by a slow increase in real wages
compared with productivity. Unit labour
costs fell substantially in the first half of the
1990s in Hungary, while in other transition
economies the opposite occurred (SZANYI,
1997).5
Other important factors for many
businesses can be geographic location and
transport costs. The higher ratio of value to
weight of processed materials in an industry,
the more likely it is that there will be scope
for subcontracting, so long as the production
can be divided into separable processing cir-
cles. In businesses with rapid market-driven
changes or established tight production co-
operation (e.g. in a ‘just-in-time’ system),
spatial considerations may become very im-
portant.
There have been some changes during
the history of subcontracting, as clearly ex-
pressed in Antalóczy and Sass (1998). They
argue that the early patterns of subcon-
tracting (e.g. in Mexico) are hardly compa-
rable with the current deals, because of the
different world economic environment.
Competitive conditions were different in the
1970s. The activity of US-based multina-
tionals in the Mexican maquiladora was
very different from that of EU-based compa-
nies in Central Europe. The maquiladora ef-
fect itself has changed a lot since then. The
earlier parameters of subcontracting6 could
                                                
5 There was also a modest decline in unit labour costs
in Poland.
6 For a recent summary of the drawbacks of the ma-
9not be maintained. There has been a change
in the way the advantages of low-cost pro-
duction facilities are utilized. The author be-
lieves that the current patterns of subcon-
tracting are much influenced by the re-
sponses of international networking to re-
cent global competitive challenges.
2. PATTERNS OF SUBCON-
TRACTING (OPT) IN HUNGARY
Subcontracting in Hungary has traditions
dating back to the 1970s. In that environ-
ment, the goal of the contractors was access
to developed markets, technology develop-
ment, and acquisition of the right to manu-
facture competitive products. Subcontract-
ing initially took place mainly in light in-
dustries such as textiles, clothing, leather
and shoes, as was the case elsewhere in the
world. It played a marginal role in the activ-
ity of the contractor firms and was regarded
as an additional source of the asset types
mentioned. As the economic regulations
were liberalized, they began to favour the
development of Western ties and subcon-
tracting linkages gained stability in many
cases. These traditional contacts began after
1990 to play an important role in corporate
adjustment strategies. Another important
impact was access to revenues and develop-
ment sources in succession to what central
planning allocated to companies. Thus, even
with at relatively low rates of pay, the ar-
rangements were regarded as highly benefi-
cial.
                                                                          
quiladora phenomenon, see Pellegrin (2000). The
likeliest negative effects are strong dependency on
powerful, developed partners, whose consequences
may be low income levels (inadequate to generate
resources for investment and own-product develop-
ment), technological dependency, isolation from
other sectors and hence limited spillover effects, and
reduction of corporate activity to a few simple proc-
essing tasks. In general, there is a fall in the chances
of limiting dependency on partners and an absence of
pull effects on the rest of the economy.
The trends in subcontracting changed
10–15 years ago. Networking features be-
came stronger and EU regulations favoured
internal cooperation schemes. Subcontract-
ing by Mediterranean countries was pro-
moted against other relations. The position
of the CEE transition economies began to
improve again with the EU association
agreements, leading to larger-scale involve-
ment. For Hungarian companies, this period
in the early 1990s coincided with a severe
liquidity crisis in the economy, which later
led to massive exits from markets. This many
firms attempted to avoid by trying subcon-
tracting as a last resort. Companies that had
some experience of Western cooperation
links were in a much more favourable situa-
tion and able to stabilize their activity
through subcontracting. Another important
condition for successful adjustment was a
smooth and if possible rapid process of pri-
vatization. Companies that had previous
links with Western partners effectively
creamed off the market, leaving only worse
deals available for less experienced candi-
dates. Moreover, the new networking type of
subcontracting required a minimum level of
trust between partners that could develop
only with time. Many companies did not
survive long enough for their partners to
build up the trust required before they as-
signed to them more sophisticated, better
paying jobs.7
From 1992–3, the relative oversupply
of companies willing to participate in sub-
contracting eased, since those in worse fi-
nancial condition were exiting from the
markets. At the same time, luckier compa-
nies were able to stabilize their financial po-
sitions and their cooperation links with
Western partners.8 The durability of con-
                                                
7 The mass scale exit of once-important, mainly state-
owned or privatized firms started in 1992, when new
bankruptcy legislation went into force. The law in-
cluded an automatic trigger, whereby firms with
overdue obligations had to file immediately for
bankruptcy (liquidation or reorganization). Several
thousand companies exited in this way during the
20-month period when the trigger was in effect.
8 This means that firms with high dependency and
unfavourable subcontracting conditions tended to
exit, while others pursuing the new, more integral
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tacts increased and the processing tasks
transferred became more complicated, pro-
ducing higher added value and more in-
come. Sometimes capital investments also
occurred. Another important feature was the
increase in the engineering industry’s share
of OPT turnover, with a decline in the share
of traditional light industry. Subcontracting
became an engine of economic growth. OPT
nowadays accounts for over 20 per cent of
Hungary’s exports and the share of manu-
facturing exports is even higher. The boom
in subcontracting, illustrated by its role in
exports, is shown in Table 1.
The customs statistics show a decline
in the role of subcontracting in export per-
formance from 1997 onwards. In fact, sev-
eral factors may have played
a role in this, because the real
volume and importance of
subcontracting did not shrink
greatly. There was a strong
exchange-rate distortion, as
the trade statistics were cal-
culated in strong dollars,
while subcontracting was
carried out mainly on the
basis of weaker European
currencies (DEM, ATS, ITL).
Another important factor was
the growing importance of customs-free
zones in the operation of subcontracting
                                                                          
type of conditions in subcontracting contacts usually
survived and carried out substantial adjustments and
corporate restructuring.
partners. OPT carried out in these areas is by
definition not recorded in customs statistics.
In reality, subcontracting gained new
momentum after 1995. Using the provisions
of the customs-free zones, a large number of
companies set up new facilities for subcon-
tracting-type activities. Customs-free zones
provide almost the same advantages as those
guaranteed in the OPT regulations.9 Ac-
cording to some estimates, the combined ef-
fect of subcontracting and customs-free
zone turnover may be as much as 40 per
cent of total exports. But if only the amount
of registered OPT from customs-free zone
turnover is added, the result is a slight de-
cline in the
share of OPT
over the past
four years, as
shown in Ta-
ble 2. This is
due to even
faster growth
in the total
export turn-
over.
                                                
9 These are mainly affiliates of multinational compa-
nies that moved certain parts of their production to
Hungary through greenfield FDI. Though their activ-
ity is not recorded as subcontracting, this is essen-
tially such trade.
Table 1
Exports and OPT, based on customs statistics for the period 1992–7
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Exports
(USD million) 10705 8907 10588 12867 12859 14044
Change in exports
(previous year = 100) - 83.2 118.9 121.5 100.0 109.2
Active subcontracting exports
(USD million) 2514 1758 2410 3096 2452 3556
Change in subc. Exports
(previous year = 100) - 69.9 137.1 128.5 111.5 103.0
Share of subcontracting
in total exports 23.5 19.7 22.5 24.0 26.9 25.3
Source: Antalóczy and Sass (1998), based on Ministry of Hungarian Industry and Trade data.
Table 2
Exports of goods and the share of OPT, 1996–9
1996 1997 1998 1999
Total goods exports
(USD million) 15704 19100 23005 25013
Increase in exports
(previous year = 100) - 121.6 120.4 108.7
OPT exports
(USD million) 3781 4035 4842 5048
Increase in OPT exports
(USD million) - 106.7 120.0 104.3
Share of OPT
in total goods exports (%) 24.1 21.1 21.0 20.2
Source: www.gm.hu/foreco/statistic/F970112/tablex0.htm
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Another important feature of OPT can
be illustrated by the trade statistics. The bal-
ance of OPT is always positive, so that it
contributes to large and increasing extent to
reducing the trade deficit. This positive bal-
ance was between USD 521 and 739 M USD
between 1996 and 1999. The main con-
tributor to this is the aggregate subcon-
tracting fee, which fluctuated to some extent
over the years. There were exceptional peaks
(e.g. in 1992, due to the war in Yugoslavia),
while in other years, the level dropped. The
general tendency over the last decade has
been a slow decline, for reasons of a statisti-
cal nature identified by Oláh (1998): the
shift towards engineering increased auto-
matically the value of the processed materi-
als and subassemblies in the calculations.
The share of engineering in OPT increased
from 20.6 per cent to 41.8 per cent between
1992 and 1997, while that of light industry
fell from 63.1 per cent to 43 per cent
(ANTALÓCZY AND SASS, 1998). Empirical sur-
veys also show that Hungarian subcontrac-
tors are not usually capable of maintaining
even the nominal level of their fees. Gains
from the devaluation of the HUF, for exam-
ple, are shared between the partners. None-
theless, the level of fees is still relatively high
(28–30 per cent of contract value), because
Hungarian firms are engaged in relatively
skilled activities, not simple assembly.
3. THE HYPOTHESIS AND
DESCRIPTION OF THE EM-
PIRICAL SURVEY
The Business Economics Department of the
Budapest University of Economics organized
a major research programme in 1996 enti-
tled ‘Competing in the World’, which was
repeated in 1999. Both surveys sampled
over 300 companies, some of which were
identical in the two runs. The first sample
included 50 companies that reported a share
of at least 20 per cent for subcontracting in
their total sales revenue. In the second sam-
ple, they were 65. This was taken as a
threshold proportion, above which subcon-
tracting was said to be playing an important
role in the firm’s activity. A share of more
than 50 per cent of turnover was defined as
primary dependence on subcontracting. The
prevalence of this type of activity in Hun-
gary is confirmed by the fact that another 50
firms reported a smaller proportion of turn-
over earned in this way (less than 20 per
cent).
The questionnaires were not designed
for researching into the present topic. This
analysis can only be described as a by-
product of the original research. However,
many questions provided interesting infor-
mation, when subcontractors’ figures were
compared with total sample averages. The
findings are summarized in the next section.
Information was collected first about the cir-
cumstances in which companies undertook
this kind of business and whether the choice
of it had been a deliberate strategic decision.
Then the results of subcontracting were
tested in the context of corporate strategy, by
comparing them with a series of perform-
ance measures. The deeper analysis dealt
with some special attributes of subcontract-
ing, such as durability of cooperation ar-
rangements, level of dependency of partners,
whether there were capital links with for-
eign partners, determinants of export com-
petitiveness, profitability of subcontracting,
price trends, and levels of technology and
knowledge transfer. Comparisons of the
sub-sample with sample averages were fol-
lowed by further division of the sub-sample
by size (more or less than 200 employees),
the weight of subcontracting (20–50 per
cent of turnover or more), ownership (do-
mestic or foreign), and branch (engineering
or light industry). All the divisions of the
sub-sample produced relatively remarkable
numbers of observations (between 23 and
53 out of a total of 115 companies in the
two surveys).
As the questionnaires were not pur-
pose-built for researching subcontracting,
not all the hypotheses developed from the
survey of literature and the statistical analy-
sis could be tested. The leitmotiv of the hy-
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pothesis was much influenced by the experi-
ence that companies did not seem to suffer
much from the negative consequences that
are regularly mentioned.10 Companies
seemed to be satisfied with their subcon-
tracting activities, which for many were a
‘part-time job’. Even firms that were
strongly dependent on subcontracting stated
that their basic expectations for revenues,
profits, job security and technological devel-
opment were met. No signs of ‘maquiladori-
zation’ could be discerned. There might be
several explanations for this. The hypothesis
states that the relatively favourable condi-
tions of subcontracting applied because
Hungarian partners became part of interna-
tional production networks. On the one
hand, the nature and role of subcontracting
were changing over time in the business
strategies of large multinationals. On the
other, Hungarian companies were able to
provide the technical, human and business
qualities that qualified them for belonging to
the international networks. The general hy-
pothesis can be translated into more specific
and testable statements.
1. Subcontracting becomes a durable busi-
ness link based on mutual, if asymmetric
division of benefits. The asymmetry is
greater with subcontractors in weaker
positions or working in crisis industries:
some sections of light industry, loss-
makers, or firms strongly dependent on
subcontracting.
2. The asymmetric division of benefits need
not mean that subcontractors cannot
achieve their goals. Subcontractors may
enjoy unilateral benefits in the form of
technology and knowledge transfers or
access to markets and competitive prod-
ucts. The acquired knowledge and pro-
duction capacities may enable subcon-
tractors to develop quality products and
penetrate new markets with their own
products and brands. Perhaps the biggest
obstacle here is lack of adequate finan-
cial backing.
                                                
10 For a summary of these, see Pellegrin (2000).
3. Subcontracting links are in flux. Suc-
cessful execution of processing or as-
sembly tasks may bring chances to do
more sophisticated, better-paying tasks.
Parts of some classic subcontracting
deals, like taking delivery of complete
sets of production inputs, may change
and local sourcing be entrusted to the
subcontractor. This also improves bar-
gaining positions and loosens depend-
ence.
4. The activity of subcontractors may be-
come integral to the international pro-
duction network, so that exit barriers
rise. This applies especially if coopera-
tion is strengthened by capital links, of
which funding of joint ventures and for-
eign participation in privatization (FDI)
are the most effective types. Capital
penetration is characteristic of engi-
neering, but there are also examples in
light industry. It is typical of engineer-
ing, because deepening cooperation
there means a massive transfer of the
intangible assets necessary for compati-
ble production. Control of use of this
knowledge is most effective if there is
some capital control. Another typical de-
velopment in Hungary was the estab-
lishment of greenfield investments for
carrying out subcontracting-type activi-
ties.
5. Stable subcontracting links provided
sufficient revenues for subcontractors
until the mid-1990s. Thereafter, they
tended to become locked into these ar-
rangements by deeper cooperation. They
were unable to achieve the increases in
fees needed to offset the revaluation of
the Hungarian currency. Prices and in-
comes declined, although they remain
high by international standards.
6. Western partners often use in the bar-
gaining process the threat to move fur-
ther East. However, there is little evi-
dence of such cost-reducing moves oc-
curring. Hungarian subcontractors
pursue jobs at the higher end of the
range, which cannot be substituted for
easily. Such activity requires a relatively
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high technology level and skilled, expe-
rienced, motivated labour not easily
available in potential competitor coun-
tries to the North-East or South-East of
Hungary.
7. A position at the high end of subcon-
tracting may develop into that of a
regular supplier. The prime requirement
is diversification of sales links by devel-
oping own products acceptable to sev-
eral firms in the industry. The costs of
market penetration can be especially
high with consumer goods.
8. According to empirical surveys, the best
subcontracting links for securing ade-
quate income levels and substantial
knowledge transfers develop directly
with Austrian or German firms (not with
an intermediary). French and Italian
firms prefer looser, occasional links,
with no major knowledge transfer and
offer only simple, low-paid tasks. Inter-
mediaries appear more frequently and
their charges are usually deducted from
the subcontracting fee.
9. Empirical evidence suggests that most
firms chose subcontracting deliberately.
Even if there were external forces (e.g.
loss of markets for own products), they
usually prepared for this type of coop-
eration and saw such deals as a route to
financial stability and modernization.
Firms that saw such cooperation as a last
resort were less able to exploit its poten-
tial benefits. Many must have exited in
the end. There were also many firms, es-
pecially in engineering and plastics,
pursuing subcontracting as an additional
activity. Their goals were mainly better
use of capacity and knowledge transfer.
4. SURVEY RESULTS
Market and institutional shocks hit subcon-
tractors and other companies in very similar
ways. The form of shock identified as most
important by respondents was market
change. Subcontractors by definition were
more sensitive to changes on foreign mar-
kets, since they tended to be export oriented.
The intensity of the changes declined over
time (Table 3). Firms did not differentiate
between external forces and intra-company
considerations as major strategy-shaping
factors. They may have had some choice of
responses to strong external threats. Sub-
contractors reported that they built quite
intensively on their foreign cooperation
linkages. Of the sub-groups, small firms and
those subcontracted as an additional activity
Table 3
Changes in markets and in the factors shaping strategy
(scale from 1 = not important to 5 = highly important)
Operation influ-
enced by com-
petition on for-
eign markets
Operation influ-
enced by com-
petition on do-
mestic markets
Strategy shaped
by external
threats
Strategy shaped
by intra-
company con-
siderations
Strategy based
on foreign coop-
eration linkages
1996 total 3.0 3.6 4.0 3.9 3.6
1996 subcon-
tracting 4.1 2.8 4.0 3.8 4.1
1999 total 2.9 3.4
1999 subcon-
tracting 3.7 2.6
Small firms 3.7 2.7 3.8 4.0 4.0
Big firms 4.0 2.7 4.0 3.6 4.3
Main activity 4.0 2.6 4.2 4.1 4.5
Additional activity 3.6 2.8 3.8 3.6 3.8
Foreign firms 4.2 2.7 3.5 3.8 4.4
Light industry 3.9 2.0 4.0 3.5 4.3
Engineering 4.0 2.8 4.3 3.9 4.4
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reported less intensive market shocks. They
and foreign companies did not feel more in-
tensive external threats when shaping their
strategy than other subcontractors did. For
small firms subcontracting in addition to
other activities, existing cooperation links
were also less important (Table 3).
Subcontracting was deliberately cho-
sen as one (seemingly the best) alternative
for corporate adjustment.11 This is clearly
shown by the responses indicating that most
subcontracting firms (more than the total
sample average) recognized and actively
responded to changes in their environment.
Moreover, almost half of them stated that
they acted proactively, not only foreseeing
important changes, but preparing their re-
sponses in advance. The most important part
of their response was carefully designed
subcontracting activity (Table 4). We may
state, therefore, that subcontracting was de-
liberately chosen from several alternatives
and seen as an important element of corpo-
rate strategy. It was not just a last resort, a
bad, but unavoidable decision that harmed
rather than helped companies.
                                                
11 It should be noted that many firms engaged in sub-
contracting as a last resort had exited by the time of
the survey, so that the conditions reflected show only
one, more favourable side of subcontracting patterns
during the early years of transition. The point here is
not that subcontracting was the ultimate vehicle of
corporate restructuring in Hungary, but that it was a
possible option, used effectively by many firms. The
strongly negative attitudes towards subcontracting
rooted in earlier experience should therefore be re-
considered.
Firms, subcontractors and others
alike, put much emphasis on qualitative
factors as a source of successful strategies.
The importance of these increased over time,
especially with subcontracting firms. The
three most important factors in strategic
success were product quality, reliable deliv-
ery and flexible adjustment to demand.
Somewhat surprising but very welcome was
the high importance also given to ethical
behaviour. Correct and reliable business
contacts seem to play an important role (Ta-
ble 5).
Since subcontracting was not regarded
as an unavoidable bad decision, it is not so
surprising that subcontracting companies
withstood the competition and produced
remarkably good performances. The figures
in Table 6 show there were no major differ-
ences among firms – subcontractors also
reached the sample av-
erages except in two im-
portant measures. Their
profitability was clearly
better in both 1996 and
1999.
However, there
were big differences
between sub-groups. The
big and the foreign-
owned firms were espe-
cially likely to show
above-average profits,
while the small firms’
profits tended not to
reach the sample average12 and were infe-
rior by most other performance measures as
well. Big firms and foreign-owned firms, on
the other hand, performed better. Interesting
and somewhat contrary to the hypothesis
was the absence of any striking difference
between the firms in the two big manufac-
turing branches, especially in profitability.
                                                
12 This is a widespread phenomenon with several
possible explanations, but not specific to subcon-
tracting firms. The profitability of small firms was
lower in the total sample as well.
Table 4
Types of adjustment strategy
(% of valid responses*)
1996
total
1996
subcon-
tracting
1999
total
1999
subcon-
tracting
My firm always recognized threats late 3 0 1 2
My firm recognized threats but was un-
able to respond 14 14 9 9
My firm recognized threats and re-
sponded reactively 41 39 40 32
My firm foresaw threats and responded
proactively 42 48 42 49
My firm foresaw threats and tried to in-
fluence its environment actively 13 9 11 11
* For different periods, multiple answers were possible.
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It may be concluded that subcontract-
ing was beneficial to companies, at least in
terms of income and profit generation. The
figures in Table 7 indicate that good per-
formance and profitability were not the only
outcomes
attributable
to subcon-
tracting,
which also
contributed
substantial
improve-
ments in the
perform-
ance meas-
ures. Firms
reported
bigger posi-
tive changes
in profit-
ability,
market
share, pro-
ductivity
and product
introduc-
tion than
the sample
average
(containing
the values
for all com-
panies).
This ad-
vantage
narrowed over time, but in the period when
stabilization was most required, subcon-
tracting was an important and useful tool
for achieving such goals.
Table 5
Aspects of corporate activity as a source of successful corporate strategy
(scale from 1 = not important to 5 = highly important)
1996 total 1996 sub-
contracting
1999 total 1999 sub-
contracting
High product quality 3.4 3.4 3.6 3.7
Reliable delivery 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.7
Flexible adjustment to demand 3.5 3.4 3.7 3.7
Good company image 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.1
Lobbying at state authorities 2.5 2.3 2.6 2.5
Sales to government 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.3
Ethical behaviour 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.6
Properly skilled management 3.5 3.2 3.4 3.2
Updated management systems 3.1 2.8 3.1 3.0
High R and D expenditures 2.6 2.4 2.7 2.6
New product introduction 3.1 2.7 3.0 2.9
Close contacts with consumers 3.4 3.1 3.4 3.2
Table 6
Corporate performance measures compared to most important competitor
(scale from 1 = not important to 5 = highly important)
Profit/
sales reve-
nue
Profit/
assets
Market
share
Technol-
ogy level
Manage-
ment
quality
Product
quality
1996 total 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.6 3.7
1996 subcontracting 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.7
1999 total 3.0 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.7
1999 subcontracting 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.3 3.9
Small firms 3.0 3.1 3.1 3.3 3.2 3.7
Big firms 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.0
Main activity 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.8
Additional activity 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.9
Foreign firms 3.6 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.8 3.9
Light industry 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.4 3.3 3.7
Engineering 3.3 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.5 4.0
Table 7
Changes in corporate performance measures
(previous year = 100, higher values = improvement, lower values = deterioration)
Market
share
Profit-
ability
Productiv-
ity
Unit
product
cost
Duration
of product
develop-
ment
Number of
products
produced
Warranty
costs
Time needed
to settle
customer
disputes
Number of
customer
disputes
1996 total 104 111 107 103 105 109 100 99 98
1996 subcontracting 110 110 110 101 104 110 99 100 95
1999 total 107 110 109 101 100 108 94 96 95
1999 subcontracting 111 114 110 103 95 116 91 95 96
Small firms 110 116 112 103 97 117 90 97 93
Big firms 112 108 109 101 101 110 100 98 98
Main activity 112 112 111 102 96 107 96 96 100
Additional activity 110 111 109 102 103 120 94 99 92
Foreign firms 114 112 111 99 90 102 90 90 91
Light industries 110 120 109 106 95 110 92 99 99
Engineering 116 111 113 103 98 120 95 96 95
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There are also figures below 100 in
Table 7, indicating deterioration in certain
measures. The duration of product develop-
ment became longer and customer disputes
more frequent and serious. A possible expla-
nation is change of consumers. Since the
deterioration was reported in the sample av-
erage as well (subcontractors were not infe-
rior in these aspects either), it can be sus-
pected that more demanding and rigorous
clients appeared on the markets. This meant
hardening of market conditions rather than
deterioration of product quality or other
product or company characteristics.
The figures in Table 7 show a slightly
better picture for small firms. Their profit-
ability and productivity improved faster than
those of others did. They also introduced a
greater number of new products, so that
their activity seems to have undergone
deeper changes than that of big firms. Inter-
esting differences can be seen between engi-
neering and light industry as well. Increas-
ing market share was more fundamental to
engineering subcontractors, but those in
light industry improved their profitability
more. The product development in engi-
neering was much more vigorous, but in
general, the expected superior performance
of engineering firms could not be clearly
discerned.
The third group of performance ques-
tions related to corporate liquidity and ac-
cess to credit. The financial status of compa-
nies must have depended heavily on the
quality of their activity. Of the three sets of
performance questions, this was the only
one to produce the expected results: sub-
contracting firms clearly performed worse
than the sample average (Table 8). Moreo-
ver, small firms in light industry applied for
and received less credit, which accords with
the hypothesis. The liquidity position of sub-
contracting firms was also somewhat worse,
except in the case of foreign-owned compa-
nies, but the situation improved over time –
sample averages and subcontractors’ data
showed clear improvement.
The questionnaire shed light on cor-
porate R and D activity, often said to be ne-
glected by subcontracting firms. In the light
of the hypothesis, the problem has to be de-
fined differently. Accepting that subcon-
tracting is a way in which Central European
(Hungarian) firms can become parts of
competitive international networks means
dealing with questions of FDI from this an-
gle. R and D capacities are assets valued and
used in the interests of the whole network. It
is obviously irrational economically to run
parallel facilities. R and D activities are also
concentrated in specialized laboratories and
research sites. Existing capacities of newly
joined (acquired) items in the network have
to be reshaped and their activities redes-
igned. This takes time. Mere discovery and
evaluation of local capacities may take years.
It has already been noted that participation
and integration in international networks
form a learning process for both sides,
Table 8
Access to credit and the liquidity position of firms
(ranked on a scale of 1–5, percentages of valid cases)
Does your firm use
bank credit?
How easily do you
obtain short-term
credits?
How easily do you
obtain long-term
term credits?
Have you applied
for debt resched-
uling in the past
three years?
Have you defaulted
on a payment in the
past three years?
1996 total 3.1 3.7 3.1 25 16
1996 subcontracting 2.8 3.4 3.0 30 25
1999 total 2.9 3.8 3.3 7 6
1999 subcontracting 2.6 3.7 3.1 13 13
Small firms 2.4 3.3 2.8 17 13
Big firms 3.1 3.8 3.3 14 23
Main activity 2.5 3.5 3.0 13 11
Additional activity 2.9 2.6 3.2 9 9
Foreign firms 3.4 3.9 3.4 13 9
Light industry 2.0 3.5 2.7 8 12
Engineering 3.4 3.8 3.3 16 9
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where trust and reliability have to develop.
There is much empirical evidence that R and
D capacities at Hungarian firms are utilized,
although activities are specialized in fewer
fields and used mainly for product develop-
ment, in cooperation with the main network
R and D laboratories.
The new and changed functions of R
and D capacities were also registered in the
sample. The most important positive mes-
sage in Table 9 is that subcontractors and
other companies alike did much more R and
D in 1999 than in 1996, or at least the fre-
quency of such activities increased consid-
erably. The figures supported the hypothesis:
subcontractors did
much less basic and
applied research but
were deeply involved
in product and tech-
nology development
and in changing pro-
duction lines (test
production and re-
tooling).
Table 10 con-
tains information
about the main rea-
sons for (tasks of)
product and technol-
ogy changes. An inter-
esting feature of the
figures is that the fre-
quency of new prod-
uct or technology in-
troduction was much
higher for subcontracting firms in 1996
than the sample average, but these excep-
tionally high values had declined strongly by
1999 to much below the average. An expla-
nation for this shift may be the vigorous re-
structuring in the first half of the 1990s. It
seems that restructuring of subcontractors’
activities was stronger and quicker
than that of other firms, which was
a clear advantage.
As far as the reasons for ac-
tivity changes are concerned,
maintaining market share was the
major one advanced. Product de-
velopment occurred mainly within
the same range of products. The
approach to maintaining market
share was to improve quality and
introduce new products. New
technologies were also introduced
mainly to improve product quality. Increas-
ing production flexibility and reducing costs
were other important aspects. The goals of
product and technology development did not
differ strongly between subcontractors and
other firms.
Companies were also asked about their
Table 9
R and D activities
(percentages of valid responses)*
1996
total
1996
subcon-
tracting
1999
total
1999
subcon-
tracting
Basic research 2 0 9 6
Applied research 16 7 18 9
Product development 40 41 52 53
Technology development 55 57 77 77
Production test, retooling 23 30 36 41
Purchase of licence 13 7 14 3
Purchase of know-how 7 5 12 3
Education, training 36 36 51 38
* Multiple responses allowed
Table 10
R and D activities
(percentages of valid responses, rankings on a scale
of 1 = minor reason, 5 = major reason)
1996
total
1996
subcon-
tracting
1999
total
1999
subcon-
tracting
New product introduction 73 86 63 38
Reasons:
Replace outdated product 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.8
Product mix development within same profile 3.5 3.7 3.8 3.8
Product mix development in new profile 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.1
Quality improvement 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0
ISO standard introduction 3.0 2.8 3.0 2.9
Keeping market share 4.2 4.0 4.1 3.8
Increase market share 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.4
New technology introduction 56 77 59 48
Reasons:
Enhance flexible production 3.6 4.0 3.6 3.8
Reduce production costs 4.0 3.9 3.9 4.0
ISO standard introduction 2.8 2.6 2.9 3.0
Improve work conditions 3.2 3.0 3.3 3.4
Limit environmental damage 3.1 2.4 3.2 2.9
Improve product quality 4.3 4.4 4.4 4.5
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export performance. This is more important
for subcontracting companies, because of
their high export intensity. Export perform-
ance may say something about the success of
the adjustment process of subcontractors,
which was evaluated in the previous pages
as exceptionally quick and thorough. The
data in Table 11 shows the rankings for the
responses to the question ‘What was the
most important competitive strength of your
company in export activity?’ The
two outstanding responses were
quality and use of existing good
contacts to customers. Quick and
flexible terms of delivery was also
ranked high, while services cou-
pled to products (perhaps not rele-
vant for many), and more surpris-
ingly, low price was not mentioned
as being of outstanding impor-
tance.
Subcontractors did not report
values greatly different from the
sample average and there were few
differences among the sub-samples
either. Quality seems to be slightly more im-
portant for big firms and for those in light
industry than for others. Good traditional
contacts, on the other hand, were used
strongly by big engineering firms. Small
firms reported significantly less weight to
traditional contacts.
Self-evaluation of competitive strength
compared with competitors produced
matching information with the previous
question. The highest ranking went to prod-
uct quality, which seems to be the main
competitive advantage of Hungarian firms.
Subcontractors evaluated their performance
slightly higher than the sample average,
which corroborates the observation about
their quick, strong adjustment process. In
terms of services, companies gauged their
performance as equal with major competi-
tors (Table 12).
The other half of Table 12 gives infor-
mation about results or benefits of corporate
adjustment and competitive strength: ob-
tainable prices and profit levels compared
with main competitors. Although firms did
not state their major competitive advantage
as low price, they estimated their prices as
lower than their competitors’. A somewhat
surprising feature was that small firms and
firms in light industry indicated that their
prices were slightly higher than competi-
Table 11
Importance attached to factors behind export competitiveness
(scale from 1 = not important to 5 = highly important)
Low
price Better services
Quick flexible
delivery Quality
Good
contacts
Better market
knowledge
1996 total 3.4 3.1 3.8 4.3 4.1 3.5
1996 subcontracting 3.6 3.0 3.7 4.2 4.3 3.7
1999 total 3.6 3.4 3.9 4.3 4.2 3.6
1999 subcontracting 3.6 3.5 3.9 4.4 4.2 3.6
Small firms 3.4 3.3 3.9 4.2 3.9 3.6
Big firms 3.7 3.2 3.8 4.4 4.5 3.7
Main activity 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.3 4.1 3.5
Additional activity 3.7 3.0 3.8 4.2 4.3 3.7
Foreign firms 3.9 3.1 3.5 4.1 4.2 3.8
Light industry 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.5 4.2 3.7
Engineering 3.7 2.9 3.7 4.1 4.4 3.5
Table 12
Levels of export competitiveness compared
with main competitor
(scale from 1 = much worse to 5 = much better than competitor)
Price level Quality Services Profit share
1996 total 2.7 3.4 3.0 2.5
1996 subcontracting 2.8 3.5 3.0 2.6
1999 total 2.8 3.6 3.0 2.6
1999 subcontracting 3.0 3.8 3.0 2.7
Small firms 3.1 3.7 2.9 2.7
Big firms 2.8 3.6 3.2 2.6
Main activity 2.9 3.6 2.9 2.6
Additional activity 2.9 3.8 3.1 2.7
Foreign firms 2.6 3.4 3.1 2.7
Light industry 3.1 3.7 2.9 2.8
Engineering 2.8 3.7 3.0 2.5
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tors’. These two groups of subcontracting
companies were the ones that used to be re-
garded as especially vulnerable and there-
fore badly paid. Firms in light industry re-
mained consistent in reporting the highest
profit share among the sub-groups. Profits of
subcontractors and other firms were the
same in the comparison with competitors.
There is a chance to check firms’
statements about achieved prices and com-
pare them with production input prices. The
comparison shows a general deterioration in
the situation: input prices rose faster than
output prices. However, the gap was felt to
be narrower in 1999. In fact, there may not
have been a real negative gap at that time at
all (Table 13).
Table 13
Price developments
Increase in
market price of
main product
(% in year of
survey)
Increase in
market price of
main input
product (% in
year of survey)
1996 total 31 39
1996 subcontracting 29 36
1999 total 20 22
1999 subcontracting 12 16
Small firms 19 25
Big firms 20 26
Main activity 19 25
Additional activity 20 26
Foreign firms 26 27
Light industry 9 14
Engineering 14 18
The last table contains some informa-
tion about the dependence of companies on
suppliers and customers. With customers,
subcontractors seem to sell a bigger share of
their turnover through long-term contracts
than other firms do. This is not surprising:
subcontracting necessarily means that sales
of products are not on ad hoc. Interestingly,
by 1999 this share had declined almost to
the sample average. No firm comment can
be made on this, but a plausible explanation
is that the importance of subcontracting
partners declined over time: firms success-
fully diversified their activities and devel-
oped their clientele. But this maybe mainly
because of the changing structure of the
sample. Unsurprisingly, big firms with main
subcontracting activity and foreign-owned
firms reported slightly higher values.
The question about the replacement of
customers and suppliers revealed to the im-
portant fact that replacing suppliers is very
easy for subcontractors as well, while selling
products is much more difficult. However,
the position of subcontractors improved sig-
nificantly in this respect, with the 3.1 value
becoming a relatively low 2.1 by 1999.
Large engineering firms seemed to be more
dependent on their customers than small
ones or firms in light industry. This is again
contrary to the primary hypothesis that said
that small firms of light industry were the
most dependent from their partners.
Table 14
Long-term sales contracts and dependence on suppliers or customers
Approximate
share of sales
through long-
term contracts
(0–20 = 1…80–
100 = 5)
How many of
your five main
suppliers could
you not replace in
the short run?
How many of
your five main
buyers could you
not replace in the
short run?
1996 total 2.4 1.9 2.7
1996 subcontracting 3.1 1.4 3.1
1999 total 2.5 1.8 2.7
1999 subcontracting 2.7 1.6 2.1
Small firms 2.8 1.6 2.2
Big firms 3.1 1.4 2.9
Main activity 3.0 1.4 2.4
Additional activity 2.8 1.7 2.7
Foreign firms 3.0 1.1 2.5
Light industry 2.7 1.6 1.9
Engineering 2.7 1.7 2.8
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CONCLUSIONS
The empirical survey was a by-product of
major questionnaire surveys about various
aspects of corporate activity. No parts of the
questionnaires were designed especially for
research into subcontracting. Consequently,
many of the research hypotheses could not
even be addressed and others were tested in
a rather poor form. However, a few impor-
tant statements could be proved, with the
help of the big sample of 115 observations.
The validity of some other statements was
seriously questioned.
Clear evidence was found that many
companies, especially successful ones, had
deliberately chosen subcontracting as an
adjustment tool. It was not the only alterna-
tive, but most probably the best under the
rather unfavourable circumstances in the
first years of transition. Firms tried to use
this as a primary source for necessary mod-
ernization inputs: technology, competitive
products and markets. Many of them be-
came in this way part of international pro-
duction networks. The majority of successful
subcontracting companies prepared their
adjustment strategies in a proactive manner.
The expected modernization effects
were achieved in most cases. The knowledge
transfer was also beneficial to Western part-
ners intending to build on long-term con-
tacts with members of their networks. These
partners were often ones with which Hun-
garian firms had traditional business con-
tacts.
The modernization effect was meas-
ured by the fact that subcontracting firms
showed quicker and deeper adjustment than
other companies in the sample. The most
important areas of adjustment were new
product development, improvements of
quality and delivery conditions, but an above
average increase of productivity was also
achieved. The financial consequences of the
successful strategies were also measured in
the survey. Subcontracting firms reported
higher profits, than the total sample average.
Subcontracting meant a reorganization
of R and D, not simply a reduction in it. The
emphasis shifted from basic and applied re-
search to product development. The contri-
bution of scientists and engineers was used
differently, in line with the interests of the
total network. The large-scale introduction
of new products and technologies was also a
clear sign of the fundamental changes in
production carried out in the first phase of
transition. After the basic restructuring had
been carried out, the process slowed consid-
erably and new production lines consoli-
dated.
The survey supported the hypothesis
that the main competitive advantage of
Hungarian subcontractors is not low prices.
Their prices were not especially low and
companies considered the quality of their
products and the flexibility of their produc-
tion to be the primary competitive advan-
tages. The third important factor in their
success was the established traditional con-
tacts with customers (obviously subcon-
tracting partners).
The survey failed to separate clearly
the groups of subcontractors in advanta-
geous or disadvantageous positions. How-
ever, much evidence was found that small
firms in light industry were not the losers in
subcontracting, for they achieved very good
financial results. The groups broken down
by size, branch and ownership characteris-
tics yielded mixed results on the various
questions. No clear-cut tendencies were ob-
served.
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